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WATSON V. UNITED STATES – THE FICA TAX
DISPUTE CONCERNING WAGES AND
DISTRIBUTIONS TO PROFESSIONAL
EMPLOYEES/OWNERS
by
Richard J. Kraus *
Joseph DiBenedetto**
Roy J. Girasa ***

INTRODUCTION
Individuals and businesses seek to avoid the payment of
taxes beyond those demanded by the law. In particular,
incorporated businesses such as closely held corporations, S
corporations, LLCs, PCs and PLLCs reduce their Internal
Revenue Code liabilities by distributing their assets as wages to
employees. At times, however, the employees of these entities
are also shareholders. In estimating and paying tax liabilities,
the incorporated businesses may wish to distribute their assets
to their employee/shareholders as dividends rather than as
wages in order to avoid tax liability for payments of
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Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA)1 taxes and Federal
Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA)2 liabilities upon employee
wages. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) seeks to ensure that
the allocation of business distributions as dividends or as
wages to employees/owners is reasonable and justified by the
Internal Revenue Code and regulations.
Watson v. United States3 decision typifies the
controversy surrounding IRS determinations that corporate
taxpayers have underpaid FICA and FUTA tax liabilities by
disguising wages as dividend payments or that the dividend
payments have been disguised as wages in order to avoid even
more onerous corporate taxes.4
This article concentrates upon the particular
controversy which arises in Watson concerning a professional
corporation’s liability for paying FICA tax upon dividend
payments to a professional shareholder-employee who served
as the corporation’s only director and who authorized the
dividend payment to himself when, in fact, a more significant
portion of the dividend should have been paid as wages. At the
same time, the article examines the entire controversy
concerning FICA, FUTA and other tax liabilities for
incorporated businesses, particularly closely held businesses,
which choose to treat wages as dividends or dividends as
wages in order to decrease tax liability. The article concludes
that the Watson decision correctly determined the liability of
the S corporation for FICA tax and warns that proposed
legislation setting pre-determined percentages for a
professional’s wages must be avoided.
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THE FICA TAX IS A TAX UPON WAGES
After graduating from college, David Watson became a
Certified Public Accountant with a Master’s Degree in
Taxation. In 1996, Watson incorporated his practice as David
E. Watson PC (DEWPC) of which he was the sole officer,
shareholder, director and employee; DEWPC elected to be
taxed as an S corporation. This corporation acted as a partner in
the accounting firm of Larson, Watson, Bartling, and Juffer,
LLP (LWBJ). LWBJ allegedly had sufficient cash flow to
distribute $2000 a month to each partner including DEWPC;
DEWPC then authorized a payment of $2000 a month to
Watson as his sole wages of $24,000 for the tax years 2002 and
2003. But in addition to his salary Watson, by a DEWPC
decision, received $203,651 as profit distributions from LWBJ
for 2002 and $175,470 as profit distributions for 2003. The IRS
investigated these distributions and determined that at least a
portion of the profit distributions from DEWPC to Watson
should be treated not as dividends but as wages. The Court of
Appeals eventually agreed with the District Court that the
reasonable amount of Watson’s wages should be set at $91,044
for both 2002 and 2003. The trial court used average billing
rates rather than Watson’s actual billing rates to determine the
wage amount. The appeals court upheld the tax deficiency
judgment against DEWPC. The judgment included unpaid
employment taxes, penalties and interest amounting to
$23,431.33.
IRC section 3121 defines wages as meaning all
remuneration for employment including the cash value of all
such items including benefits paid in any medium other than
cash. As the code regulations indicate,5 wages include salaries,
fees, bonuses, and commissions on sales and on insurance
premiums if paid as compensation for employment. The basis
upon which remuneration is paid is immaterial and includes a
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percentage of the profits,6 such as the distribution of profits to
Watson in this case.

WAGES ARE REMUNERATION
PERFORMED BY AN EMPLOYEE

FOR

SERVICES

Although Watson argued that DEWPC was distributing
to him a return on his investment in the accounting
incorporated business, the critical FICA tax question concerns
whether the statute and facts indicate that at least a portion of
the payments made to Watson constituted remuneration for
services performed by an employee. The Internal Revenue
Code, Section 3121(d) defines an employee as any officer of a
corporation or any individual who, under usual common law
rules, has the status of an employee.7 The Court of Appeals
cited a series of cases which aided its decision in determining
Watson’s employee status.
Radtke, S.C. v. United States –Services Actually Rendered Must
Be Remunerated As Wages
In Joseph Radtke, S.C. v. United States8the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided that Joseph Radtke
S.C. a subchapter S corporation of which attorney Joseph
Radtke was its sole shareholder-employee, was subject to
Social Security FICA and FUTA taxes upon distributions to
him. In the tax year 1982, Mr. Radtke received no salary from
the corporation but received $18,225 in dividends for that year.
He paid personal income tax on the dividend and the
corporation also declared $18,225 on its small business
corporation income tax return. The IRS, with the agreement of
the District and Appeals courts decided that the dividends were
wages subject to FICA and FUTA contributions.9 Dividends
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may not be paid in lieu of compensation for services actually
rendered.

Schneider v. Commissioner – Special Scrutiny Cases Include
Those in Which Employees Are Also Owners
In cases such as the Watson controversy, special and
intense scrutiny will be given to distributions where the
corporation is controlled by the very employees to whom the
distribution is made. Such a lack of arm’s length dealing
between the corporation and the employee raises suspicion of
subterfuge concerning the payment of mandated taxes. In
Charles Schneider & Co. v. Commissioner 10the 8th Circuit
Court of Appeals faced the other side of the wages/dividends
controversy: whether wages paid to employees-shareholders
were reasonable and necessary as business deductions for the
corporation or dividends subject to more substantial corporate
taxation upon the entity’s income. The court agreed with the
IRS and the United States Tax Court that the wages, including
bonuses, paid to the employees-owners were not reasonable
and necessary business expenses11 but were corporate
dividends. The court determined deficiency income tax
liability against Schneider & Co for the 1966, 1967, and 1968
tax years in the amounts of $23,512.40, $15,333.42, and
$21,721.05 respectively. The court also held another allied
furniture corporation liable for deficiencies for those tax years
in the amounts of $18,130.17, $3,475.46 and $7,365.58.
The facts of this case reveal that Charles Schneider
organized a number of furniture and upholstering
manufacturing businesses of which he was the sole or principal
shareholder. The closely held corporation which Schneider
directed permitted distributions to a number of other
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shareholders including himself in excess of the normal amounts
paid as wages including bonuses to other industry employees.
The court noted that several factors helped to determine
reasonableness of compensation: the employee’s qualifications;
the nature of the work, its size and complexity; a comparison of
salaried to gross and net business incomes; the prevailing rates
of compensation for comparable positions in comparable
concerns and the history of compensation paid in previous
years. Because this corporation was closely held, special
scrutiny of all of these factors resulted in the court’s conclusion
that the companies paid more wages and bonuses to their
employees than other similar businesses and that the payment
to some of the employee-shareholders increased even though
their workload decreased. The court noted finally that the
bonus agreements were governed by corporation bylaws which
required the employees to repay their bonuses if they were later
declared by a court not to be deductible expenses for tax
purposes.12 It appeared that the corporations’ tax counsel had
already anticipated a taxability issue.
The Court of Appeals in the Watson decision utilized
the Schneider reasoning to justify the intense examination of
the controversy. DEWPC’s distribution to Watson in like
manner should be subject to close scrutiny: Watson sought to
declare a portion of his wages as his wholly owned
corporation’s dividends to him, thereby evading FICA liability,
but a closer examination of the facts helped to reveal the
unjustifiable evasion tactic.
Standard Asbestos v. Commissioner – Case Facts Help
to Determine Tax Liabilities
In Watson and in all similar controversies, the facts of
each case will determine whether payments to a shareholder
are compensation for services rendered or distributions of
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profits from the business. Standard Asbestos Manufacturing
and Insulating Co. v. Commissioner13once again describes a
situation where a closely held corporation was determined to
have paid excessive unreasonable salaries to three of its
shareholders and that a pension paid to a deceased
shareholder’s wife was a distribution of profits and not a
pension, taxable to her and not deductible by the corporation.
In Standard, three brother shareholders solely managed
an asbestos manufacturing and insulating business founded in
1918 by their father, whose shares upon his death had passed to
his widow, the brothers’ mother. During the 1920’s and 1930’s
the Ryder Brother’s received wages below the standard for the
industry, until about 1937. From this year corporate resolutions
substantially increase their wages in order to compensate for
previous low salaries. But for the tax years 1949, 1950 and
1951 the corporate resolution in question arranged for bonuses
to be paid to the brothers without referring to the fact that they
were intended for services rendered in prior years. Pursuant to
this resolution, each of the brothers was respectively paid the
sums of $52,232.14, $65,290.17 and $65,289.17 during the tax
years 1949, 1950 and 1951. The Commissioner of Internal
Revenue and U.S. Tax Court then determined that for the 1949,
1950 and 1951 tax years, the sums paid to each of the brothers
was in excess of a reasonable amount so that tax deficiencies
were assessed against them for any amounts in excess of
$42,500.00 for 1949 and $47,500.00 for 1950 and 1951.
The Commissioner and the Court examined extensive
evidence concerning the salaries of the brothers paid in prior
years. On December 20, 1937 a corporate resolution directed
additional payment of wages for the years 1928 to 1930 by
raising the compensation by 40%; on January 6, 1941 the
salaries of the Ryder brothers were raised to $11,000 because
of low salaries paid to them and on January 5, 1942 a corporate
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resolution, once again, cited prior low salaries and raised the
brothers’ waged to $20,000. As already stated, however, the
later corporate resolution in question made no mention of prior
low salaries.
The percentage of the corporation’s net income used to
pay the salary bonuses also led the Commissioner and the court
to decide that the salaries were unreasonable. In particular, the
court noted that the salary bonuses represented a very high
percentage of the company’s net income during the taxable
years, while no other officer of the corporation received more
than $9,000.000 in income during the years in question. The
court quoted Builders Steel Co. v. Commissioner:
The bonuses given at the end of the year, according to
the minutes of the petitioner, were based to a large
extent at least upon the earnings that the company had
made during the year and its consequent ability to pay.
In addition to the fact that there were large earnings
resulting to a greater or lesser extent from the efforts of
these officers and employees, we cannot escape the
thought that the distribution of earnings of the company
had the effect of very substantially reducing the excess
profit taxes collectible against the petitioner [emphasis
added]. 14
The bonuses were used as a subterfuge to avoid properly due
corporate taxes.
The salaries paid to competitors in similar businesses
additionally convinced the Commissioner and the court of the
unreasonableness of the salary bonuses. The president of a
competing company offered credible testimony that he
received a salary of approximately $16,000.00 in 1949 and
approximately $26,000.00 in 1950 and 1951; the court judged
his experience and ability to be comparable to that of the tax
payer company’s officers, the Ryder brothers, and that their
activities and hours of work were also quite similar.
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In addition, the pension paid to Alice D. Ryder, 84
years old, was not a pension for the founder’s widow but a
distribution of profits and hence taxable to her. The taxpayer
Standard Asbestos Company paid to Alice D. Ryder, the
widow of Willard E. Ryder, deceased, the following pension
amounts which the company deducted from its taxable income:
$20,491.08 in 1949, $32,645.08 in 1950 and $32,645.09 in
1951. The Commissioner and the Tax Court noted that Alice D.
Ryder’s husband had held 473 ¼ shares of the company’s 500
shares of stock before his death but had divided them, among
others, to the three Ryder brothers and to his widow. The
transfer agreement contained covenants restricting the transfer
of the stock, and created a pension for Alice D. Ryder so long
as she held the shares and did not re-marry. The agreement
contained no references which designated the pension as
recognition for the past services of her husband. The
Commissioner, the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals
reasoned that the pension payments were made for the purpose
of assuring control over the stock and would not be deductible
business expenses, but would constitute a distribution of profits
taxable to Alice D. Ryder. 15
In regard to the pension paid to Alice D. Ryder, the
court noted that the corporate resolutions indicated that the
pension was to assure control over the future alienation of
shares and was not a deductible business expense but a
distribution of profits taxable to the corporation.
Once again, the Court of Appeals used the facts of
Ryder decision to justify its agreement with the findings of the
Commissioner and the Tax Court in the Watson controversy.
The facts of Watson clearly indicate that David Watson
received at least a portion of DEWPC’s profits as remuneration
for wages paid for his services. The $24,000 annual salary
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which he received could not at all recompense him for his
contributions of skill and work given to the corporation which
he himself wholly owned.
THE REASONABLENESS CRITERION FOR
DETERMINATION OF EMPLOYEE STATUS AND
AMOUNT OF REMUNERATION
The Eighth Circuit Court in Watson noted that the
Commissioner and the Tax Court had to determine the proper
basis for treating David Watson as an employee and the
reasonable amount of salary paid to him for the personal
services which he actually rendered. Although reasonable
compensation usually concerns corporate income tax
deduction, a 1974 IRS Revenue Ruling concerning small
business corporation dividends paid instead of salaries had
stated that the concept applies equally to FICA tax cases.16 In
its ruling, the IRS indicated that the dividend payments of an S
corporation constituted wages for FICA tax purposes because
the corporation’s two shareholder-employees performed
reasonably substantial services for the corporation, but received
no reasonable wages for those services; in fact no wages at all
were paid to them. The Service, in response to the revenue
ruling inquiry, concluded that the dividends were paid as
reasonable compensation for the reasonably substantial
services of those shareholder-employees.
In the Radtke controversy mentioned above the attorney
sole shareholder of an S corporation also received no salary
and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
conclusions that attorney Radtke had performed reasonably
substantial services as an employee of the corporation and that
the so-called dividend payments were clearly reasonable
remuneration for those services rather than a return of
investment to a shareholder.
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Veterinary
Surgical
Consultants,
P.C.
v.
Commissioner17 in like manner decided that a veterinarian tax
payer, the sole shareholder of a professional S corporation,
cannot claim that the distributions to him were merely
dividends which represented a return on his investment. The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the Tax Court and
Commissioner that a reasonableness criterion must apply to the
facts of this case to determine the substantiality of work
performed and the wages paid in relationship to that work.
Dr. Kenneth K. Sadanaga practiced veterinary medicine
in Pennsylvania during the tax years 1994, 1995 and 1996. Dr.
Sadanaga functioned as a full-time employee of Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. during this time and reported wages from the
company of $91,212.18 in 1994, $95,851.15 in 1995 and
$102,031.14 in 1996; the company withheld the necessary
Social Security taxes from his wages. During the same period,
however, the Veterinary Surgical Consultants, P.C. S
Corporation (VSC) paid to Dr. Sadanaga “non-employee
compensation” of $83,995.50 in 1994, $173,030.39 in 1995
and $161,483.35 in 1996. Dr. Sadanaga was VSC’s sole
shareholder and its only officer. All of VSC’s income was
generated from the consulting and surgical services performed
by Dr. Sadanaga; he was the sole signatory on the
corporation’s bank account and handled all of its
correspondence; he performed substantial services for the
corporation working approximately 33 hours a week.
The Tax Court concluded, and the Court of Appeals
agreed, that the Commissioner had found overwhelming and
certainly reasonable evidence that Dr. Sadanaga performed the
entire substance of the work for the corporation and that the
distributions in 1994, 1995 and 1996 constituted a reasonable
compensation for the veterinarian and were subject to FICA
and even FUTA taxes. The Tax Court noted that the form of
payments could be but a subterfuge for the reality of their
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payment and that the intention of receiving the payments as
dividends or distributions of profits had no bearing on the tax
treatment of his wages.18
The Court of Appeals also agreed with the Tax Court
that the 1978 Revenue Act Section 530 safe harbor provisions19
do not apply to the facts of this case. It is true that VSC did not
treat Dr. Sadanaga as an employee for any tax period in
question but VSC could not reasonably rely on any of the
following three additionally needed exceptions to the rule that
Dr. Sadanaga need not be treated as an employee: (a) judicial
precedent, published rulings, technical advice or a letter ruling;
(b) past IRS order of the taxpayer; or (c) long standing industry
practice. The two judicial precedents upon which VSC relied,
Durando v. United States20 and Texas Carbonate Co. v.
Phinney 21, did not produce reasonable bases for any exception.
The Durando decision concerned the treatment of S
Corporation shareholders as shareholders and would not affect
a determination that Dr. Sadanaga, although a shareholder, was
also an employee of VSC22. Texas Carbonate improperly read
the provisions of Section 530 but properly determined in any
event that a shareholder-director-manager of a company was an
employee for federal employment tax purposes.23
Elliotts, Inc. v. Commissioner24 also treated the topic of
reasonableness. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
however, did not agree with the Commissioner and Tax Court
concerning the reasonableness of the bonus paid to its CEO and
sole shareholder.
Elliotts, Inc., the taxpayer, was a closely held Idaho
corporation which sold John Deere Company equipment and
services equipment from Deere and other manufacturers.
Edward G. Elliott was the corporation’s chief executive officer
and sole shareholder during the tax period in question; he
always had total responsibility for the business as its manager
of some 40 employees. The corporation paid Elliott a fixed
salary of $2000 a month plus a bonus fixed at 50% of its net
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profits. For the tax years 1975 and 1976, the corporation paid
Elliott a total compensation of $181,074 for 1975 and $191,663
for 1976. The Tax Court agreed that the compensations paid
were unreasonable, but adjusted the Commissioner’s finding to
seek deficiency assessments of compensation paid in excess of
$120,000 for 1975 and $125,000 for 1976.
The Court of Appeals agreed that Elliott obviously was
an employee of the corporation. He performed the duties of an
employee as its manager and was reasonably entitled to
compensation for his services. The appeals court, however,
remanded the case to the Tax Court on the issue of
reasonableness of compensation. The court closely examined
the shareholder-employee problem; it recognized that this
situation is troublesome because the corporation and the
shareholder-employee do not deal with each other at arm’s
length. The Commissioner and the Tax Court, however, must
determine the proper allocation between compensation paid for
services rendered and a share of profits distribution not
deductible by the corporation. The Court observed that IRC
Section 162(a) (1) permits a corporation to deduct “a
reasonable allowance for salaries paid for personal services”. 25
The payments must satisfy the statute’s two-prong test that the
compensation be in fact reasonable and be made purely for
services rendered.26
The Court of Appeals then suggested five criteria to
determine the reasonableness of compensation paid to Elliott.
The court noted that a. Elliot’s role as employee in the
company included 80 hours of work per week as its sole and
dedicated manager; b. compared to other companies’
managers, Elliott did the work of three people compared to
managers at other John Deere dealers; c. the character and
condition of the company’s sales, net income and capital value
revealed the complexity of the business which Elliott managed;
d. the conflict of interest which exists in the shareholderemployee relationship does not prevent Elliott from
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distributing a bonus to himself despite the close scrutiny which
must be given to the relationship, provided that an independent
shareholder would permit a large bonus to Elliott and not view
the bonus as an impairment of the shareholder’s equity in the
corporation; e. internal consistency in the distribution of the
bonus to Elliott existed because, since its incorporation, the
business had a longstanding, consistently applied
compensation plan in which it paid to Elliott an annual
incentive bonus equal to fifty percent of its net profits.
DECISION OF THE WATSON COURT
Taking all factors and evidence into account, the Court
of Appeals agreed with the District Court that DEWPC was
subject to a FICA tax deficiency assessment because the
wholly owned S corporation had understated David Watson’s
wages by $67,044.00. The Court reasoned that the following
assisted in the computation of a reasonable compensation for
Watson: his superior qualifications as certified public
accountant, including his advanced taxation degree and 20
years’ professional experience; his 35 to 45 hour work week
for LWBJ, which grossed between $2 million and $3 million
for the tax years 2002 and 2003; the $200,000 distributed by
LWBJ to DEWPC in both 2002 and 2003 compared to the
exceedingly low $24,000 annual salary paid to Watson by
DEWPC. The Court then agreed that, by comparing Watson’s
qualifications with similar professionals in the market, the
District Court properly set Watson’s wages at $91,044.27

CONCLUSION
The Internal Revenue Code, IRS publications and the
decisions described above correctly indicate that the wages of a
professional such as David Watson should be subject to FICA
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and FUTA tax liabilities. Profit or dividend distribution to
such professionals should not be used as a subterfuge to avoid
the payment of such taxes, just as the payments of excessive
salaries or bonuses may not be used to disguise liabilities for
taxes owed by the corporations themselves.
It should be noted that the employment tax rules for S
corporations may be subject to change in that S corporation
shareholders who significantly participate in the business of the
corporation may have to treat 70% of their combined
compensation distributive share as net earnings from selfemployment, and the remaining 30% as earnings on invested
capital. 28 The Watson and allied decisions are certainly a more
accurate way of determining tax rules, even though more
complicated, rather than simplified.
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